Compatibility and status
Last reviewed: 2026-10-31.
| Capability | Available |
|---|---|
| Preliminary JPEG/TIFF prefix hints | Yes; not structural validation |
| JPEG, TIFF/DNG, and ISOBMFF/HEIC structure listing | Yes; bounded and fuzzed. Not ARI detection |
| Composite ML-DSA-87 + RSA-3072-PSS signature check | Yes, as a library primitive tested against IETF vectors. Not connected to verification |
| RFC 3161 timestamp token check (ECDSA P-256) | Yes, against a caller-supplied certificate. No path validation. Not connected to verification |
| Versioned JSON reports | Experimental: verification schema 1, structure schema 1 |
| C interface | Experimental ABI 1 |
| Apple ARI revision detection | No |
| Apple reference image verification | No |
| Trust and revocation validation | No |
| Published language packages | No |
| Hardware acceleration | Planned; no benchmark claims |
The engine reports indeterminate for every verification request. Missing specifications or evidence must not become a successful authenticity verdict.
What is blocking verification
Apple has described the design and documented how users capture, develop, and share reference images. It has not published:
- the file format: where the signature sits and which bytes it covers;
- the signing certificates or trust anchors;
- the revocation list format or a way to obtain it;
- sample files that may be redistributed for testing.
Apple's third-party API on iOS, iPadOS, and macOS 27 detects reference image data and shows Apple's viewer. It does not return a verification result. A third-party site reports that Apple plans to publish cross-platform verification documentation next year; OpenARI has not found an Apple source for that.
What is known
- The final signature is a composite of ML-DSA-87 and RSA-3072 RSASSA-PSS. Apple's Private Cloud Compute source release of 2026-10-23 names it
MLDSA87_RSA3072_PSS_SHA512_DR13. OpenARI reads this as IETF composite signature draft revision 13, which gives a 5011-byte signature. Apple has not confirmed this reading. - Capture time bounds are RFC 3161 timestamp tokens signed with ECDSA P-256.
- The photo GUID used for revocation is derived from the hash of the developed JPEG, so a published revocation list could be checked offline.
The format evidence register lists every source with its date and confidence.